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Abstract
The last few years have seen a staggering number of empirical studies of the robustness
of neural networks in a model of adversarial perturbations of their inputs. Most rely on an
adversary which carries out local modifications within prescribed balls. None however has so
far questioned the broader picture: how to frame a resource-bounded adversary so that it can be
severely detrimental to learning, a non-trivial problem which entails at a minimum the choice
of loss and classifiers.
We suggest a formal answer for losses that satisfy the minimal statistical requirement of
being proper. We pin down a simple sufficient property for any given class of adversaries to be
detrimental to learning, involving a central measure of “harmfulness” which generalizes the
well-known class of integral probability metrics. A key feature of our result is that it holds for
all proper losses, and for a popular subset of these, the optimisation of this central measure
appears to be independent of the loss. When classifiers are Lipschitz – a now popular approach
in adversarial training –, this optimisation resorts to optimal transport to make a low-budget
compression of class marginals. Toy experiments reveal a finding recently separately observed:
training against a sufficiently budgeted adversary of this kind improves generalization.
1 Introduction
Starting from the observation that deep nets are sensitive to imperceptible perturbations of their
inputs [Szegedy et al., 2013], a surge of recent work has focussed on new adversarial training
approaches to supervised learning [Athalye et al., 2018a,b, Bastani et al., 2016, Buckman et al.,
2018, Bubeck et al., 2018, Cai et al., 2018, Dhillon et al., 2018, Fawzi et al., 2018, Gilmer et al.,
2018, Goswami et al., 2018, Guo et al., 2018, Ilias et al., 2018, Kurakin et al., 2017, Ma et al., 2018,
Madry et al., 2018, Samangouei et al., 2018, Song et al., 2018, Tramèr et al., 2018, Uesato et al.,
∗Appears in ICML 2019. Authors in alphabetical order. Work started while AKM was with the ANU and ZS was
visiting Data61.
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2018, Wang et al., 2018, Wong and Zico Kolter, 2018] (and references within). In the now popular
model of Madry et al. [2018], we want to learn a classifier from a set H, given a distribution of
clean examples D and loss `. Adversarial training then seeks to find
arg min
h∈H
E(X,Y)∼D
[
max
δ:‖δ‖≤δ∗
`(Y, h(X+ δ))
]
, (1)
where ‖.‖ is a norm and δ∗ is the budget of the adversary. It has recently been observed that
adversarial training damages standard accuracy as data size and adversary’s budget (δ∗) increases
Tsipras et al. [2019]. A Bayesian explanation is given for a particular {D, ‖.‖, `} in Tsipras et al.
[2019], and the authors conclude their findings questioning the interplay between adversarial
robustness and standard accuracy.
In this paper, we dig into this relationship (i) by casting the standard accuracy and loss in (1) in
the broad context of Bayesian decision theory Grünwald and Dawid [2004] and (ii) by considering
a general form of adversaries, not restricted to the ones used in (1). In particular, we assume that
the loss is proper, which is just a general form of statistical unbiasedness that many popular choices
meet [Hendrickson and Buehler, 1971, Reid and Williamson, 2010]. The minimization of a proper
loss gives guarantees on the accuracy (for example, Kearns and Mansour [1996]), so it directly
connects to the setting of Tsipras et al. [2019]. Regarding the adversaries, instead of relying on the
local adversarial modification X→ X+ δ for some ‖δ‖ ≤ δ∗, we consider a set of possible local
modifications X → a(X) for some a ∈ A ⊆ XX (A fixed). We then analyze the conditions on A
under which, for some ε > 0,
min
h∈H
E(X,Y)∼D
[
max
a∈A
`(Y, h ◦ a(X))
]
≥ (1− ε)`0 , (2)
where `0 is the loss of the "blunt" predictor which predicts nothing. If h has range R, this blunt
predictor is in general 0 (for the log loss, square loss, etc), which translates into a class probability
estimate of 1/2 for all observations and global accuracy of 50% for two classes, i.e. that of an
unbiased coin. We see the connection of (2) to the accuracy: as ε↘, the learner will be tricked into
converging to an extremely poorly accurate predictor. How one can design such provably efficient
adversaries, furthermore under tight budget constraints, is the starting point of our paper.
Our first contribution (Section 4) analyzes budgeted adversaries that can enforce (2). Our
main finding shows that (2) is implied by a very simple condition involving a central quantity γ
generalizing the celebrated integral probability metrics [Sriperumbudur et al., 2009]. Furthermore,
under some additional condition on the loss, satisfied by the log, square and Matsushita losses, the
adversarial optimization of γ does not depend on the loss. In other words,
the adversary can attack the learner disregarding its loss.
Our second contribution (Section 5) considers the adversarial optimisation of γ when the
classifiers in H satisfy a generalized form of Lipschitz continuity. Controlling Lipschitz continuity
has recently emerged as a solution to limit the impact of adversarial examples [Cissé et al., 2017].
In this context, efficient budgeted adversaries take a particular form: we show that, for an adversary
to minimize γ,
it is sufficient to compress the optimal transport plan between class marginals using the Lipschitz
function as transportation cost, disregarding the learner’s H.
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clean class marginals adversarial class marginals OT plan
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transformations from digit-1 transformations from digit-3
0 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.6 0 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.6
#1 #3
#2 #4
Table 1: Top table: compression of the optimal transport (OT) plan for a Mixup adversary on a
toy 1D data. Bottom table: transformations performed by a Monge adversary for the digit-1 vs
digit-3 classification problem on four USPS digits (noted #1 to #4), for various adversarial
budgets (0 = clean data, see Section 7 for details).
This result puts the machinery of optimal transport (OT) to the table of adversarial design Villani
[2009], with a new purpose (the compression of OT plans). These two findings turn out to be very
useful from an experimental standpoint: we have implemented two kinds of adversaries inspired
by our theory (called Mixup and Monge for their respective links with Zhang et al. [2018], Villani
[2009]); Table 1 displays their behaviour on two simple problems. We have observed that training
a learner against a ”weak” (severely budgeted) adversary improves generalization on clean data,
a phenomenon also observed elsewhere Tsipras et al. [2019], Zhang et al. [2018]. The digit
experiment displays how our adversaries progressively transform observations of one class into
credible observations of the other (See Experiments in Section 7, and the Supplement, Appendix).
Our third contribution (Section 6) is an adversarial boosting result: it answers the question as
to whether one can efficiently craft an arbitrarily strong adversary from the sole access to a black
box weak adversary. In the framework of reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces (RKHS), we show that
this "weak adversary"⇒ "strong adversary" design does exist, and our proof is constructive: we
build one.
Our proof revolves around a standard concept of fixed point theory: contractive mappings. We
insist on the computational efficiency of this design, linear in the coding size of the Wasserstein
distance between class marginals. It shows that, on some adversarial training problems, the existence
of the weakest forms of adversaries implies that much stronger ones may be available at cheap
(computational) cost.
3
2 Related work
Formal approaches to the problem of adversarial training are sparse compared to the growing
literature on the arms race of experimental results. The formal trend has started on adversarial
changes to a loss to be optimized [Sinha et al., 2018] or more directly on a classifier’s output
[Hein and Andriushchenko, 2017, Raghunathan et al., 2018]. For example, [Sinha et al., 2018]
add a Wasserstein penalty to a loss, computing the distance between the true and adversarial
distributions. They provide smoothness guarantees for the loss and robustness in generalization
for its minimization. [Raghunathan et al., 2018] directly penalize the classifier’s output (not a loss
per se), in the context of shallow networks, and compute adversarial perturbations in a bounded
L∞ ball. A similar approach (but in Lp-norm) is taken in [Hein and Andriushchenko, 2017] for
kernel methods and shallow networks. Recent ones also focus on introducing general robustness
constraints [Bastani et al., 2016].
More recently, a handful of work have started to investigate the limits of learning in an adversarial
training setting, but they are limited in that they address particular simulated domains with a
particular loss to be optimized, and consider particular adversaries [Bubeck et al., 2018, Fawzi et al.,
2018, Gilmer et al., 2018]. The distribution can involve Gaussians of mixtures [Bubeck et al., 2018,
Fawzi et al., 2018] or the data lies on concentric spheres [Gilmer et al., 2018]. The loss involves a
distance based on a norm for all, and the adversary makes local shifts to data of bounded radius.
In the case of Bubeck et al. [2018], the access to the data is restricted to statistical queries. The
essential results are either that robustness requires too much information compared to not requiring
robustness [Bubeck et al., 2018], or the "safety" radius of inoffensive modifications is in fact small
relative to some of the problem’s parameters, meaning even "cheap" adversaries can sometimes
generate damaging adversarial examples [Fawzi et al., 2018, Gilmer et al., 2018]. This depicts a
pretty negative picture of adversarial training — negative but local: all these results share the same
common design pattern of relying on particular choices for all key components of the problem:
domain, loss and adversaries (and eventually classifiers). There is no approach to date that would
relax any of these choices, even less so one that would simultaneously relax all.
3 Definitions and notations
We present some important definitions and notations.
. Proper losses. Many of our notations follow Reid and Williamson [2010]. Suppose we have
a prediction problem with binary labels. We let ` : {−1, 1} × [0, 1] → R denote a general loss
function to be minimized, where the left argument is a class Y ∈ {−1, 1} and the right argument is
a class probability estimate (R is the closure of R). Its conditional Bayes risk function is the best
achievable loss when labels are drawn with a particular positive base-rate,
L(pi)
.
= inf
c
EY∼pi`(Y, c), (3)
where pi ∈ [0, 1], so that Pr[Y = 1] = pi and Pr[Y = −1] .= 1 − pi. We call the loss proper iff
Bayes prediction locally achieves the minimum everywhere1: L(pi) = EY`(Y, pi), ∀pi ∈ [0, 1]. One
1Losses for which properness makes particular sense are called class probability estimation losses [Reid and
Williamson, 2010].
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value of L is interesting in our context, the one which corresponds to Bayes rule returning maximal
"uncertainty", i.e. for pi = 1/2,
`◦ .= L
(
1
2
)
. (4)
Without further ado, we give the key definition which makes more precise the framework sketched
in (2).
Definition 1 For any proper loss ` and (H,A) integrable with respect to some distribution D, the
adversarial loss `(H,A, D) is defined as
`(H,A, D)
.
= min
h∈H
E(X,Y)∼D
[
max
a∈A
`(Y, h ◦ a(X))
]
. (5)
For any ε ∈ [0, 1], we say that H is ε-defeated by A on ` iff
`(H,A, D) ≥ (1− ε) · `◦. (6)
Intuitively, if the adversary can modify instances such that the learner does not do much better than
a trivial blunt constant predictor, the adversary can declare victory. The additional quantities (such
as the integrability condition) are given later in this section. To finish up with general proper losses,
as an example, the log-loss given by `(+1, c) = − log c and `(−1, c) = − log(1− c) is proper, with
conditional Bayes risk given by the Shannon entropy L(pi) = −pi · log pi − (1− pi) · log(1− pi).
. Composite, canonical proper losses. We let H ⊆ RX denote a set of classifiers. To convert real
valued predictions into class probability estimates [McCullagh and Nelder, 1989], one traditionally
uses an invertible link function ψ : [0, 1] → R, forming a composite loss `ψ(y, v) .= `(y, ψ−1(v))
[Reid and Williamson, 2010]. We shall leave hereafter the adjective composite for simplicity, and
the link implicit from context whenever appropriate. The unique (up to multiplication or addition
by a scalar [Buja et al., 2005]) canonical link for a proper loss ` : {−1, 1} × [0, 1]→ R is defined
from the conditional Bayes risk as ψ .= −L′ [Reid and Williamson, 2010, Section 6.1], [Buja
et al., 2005]. As an example, for log-loss we find the canonical link ψ(u) = log u
1−u , with inverse
the well-known sigmoid ψ−1(v) = (1 + e−v)−1. A proper loss will also be assumed to be twice
differentiable. Twice differentiability is a technical convenience to simplify derivations. It can be
removed [Reid and Williamson, 2010, Footnote 6]. A canonical proper loss is a proper loss using
the canonical link.
. Adversaries. Let A ⊆ XX denote a set of adversaries, so that any a ∈ A is allowed to transform
instances in some way (e.g., change pixel values on an image). Suppose D (fixed) denotes a
distribution overX×{−1, 1} and P (resp. N ) is the corresponding distribution conditioned on Y = 1
(resp. Y = −1). The only assumption we make about adversaries is a measurability one. We assume
that ∀h ∈ H, ∀a ∈ A, h ◦ a is integrable with respect to P and N : h ◦ a ∈ L1(X, dP )∩L1(X, dN).
For the sake of simplicity, we shall denote the tuple (H,A) integrable with respect to D. Assuming
loss ` is proper composite with link ψ, there is one interesting constant h◦ ∈ R:
h◦ .= ψ
(
1
2
)
, (7)
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because this value delivers the real valued prediction corresponding to maximal uncertainty in (4).
For example, when the loss is proper canonical and furthermore required to be symmetric, i.e. there
is no class-dependent misclassification cost, we have [Nock and Nielsen, 2008]
h◦ = 0, (8)
which corresponds to a classifier always abstaining and indeed delivering maximal uncertainty on
prediction. It is not hard to check that `◦ = E(X,Y)∼D[`(Y, h◦)] is the loss of constant h◦. So we can
now see that in Definition 1, as ε↘ 0, training against the adversarial loss essentially produces a
classifier no better than predicting nothing. We do not assume that h◦ ∈ H, but keep in mind that
such prediction with maximal uncertainty is the baseline against which a learner has to compete to
"learn" something.
. The adversarial distortion parameter γ. We now unveil the key parameter used earlier in the
Introduction. For any f ∈ L1(X, dQ), u, v ∈ R, we let:
ϕ(Q, f, u, v)
.
=
∫
X
u · (f(x) + v)dQ(x). (9)
For any g : R→ R, the adversarial distortion γ is:
γ
g
H,a(P,N, pi, b, c)
.
= max
h∈H
{ϕ(P, g ◦ h ◦ a, pi, b)− ϕ(N, g ◦ h ◦ a, 1− pi,−c)}. (10)
Finally, γH,a
.
= γIdH,a. While abstract, we shall shortly see that quantities γH,a,γ
g
H,a relate to a
well-known object in the study of distances between probability distributions. Let
γ`hard
.
= piL(1) + (1− pi)L(0). (11)
As an example, we have for the the log-loss γ`hard = 0,∀pi, with the convention 0 log 0 = 0. We
remark that γ`hard in (11) is related to γ
g
H,a in (10):
γ`hard = γ
g∗
H∗,a(P,N, pi, 0, 0), (12)
for g∗ .= Y · L and H∗ the singleton classifier which makes the hard prediction 0 over N and 1 over
P (Hereafter, we note γg
∗
H∗,a instead of γ
g∗
H∗,a(P,N, pi, 0, 0) for short). Remark that such a classifier
is not affected by a particular adversary, but it is not implementable in the general case as it would
require to know the class of an observation.
4 Main result: the hardness theorem
We now show a lower bound on the adversarial loss of (5).
Theorem 2 For any proper loss `, link ψ and any (H,A) integrable with respect toD, the following
holds true:
`(H,A, D) ≥
(
`◦ − 1
2
·min
a∈A
βa
)
+
, (13)
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where:
x+
.
= max{0, x},
βa
.
= γgH,a(P,N, pi, 2L(1), 2L(0)),
g
.
= (−L′) ◦ ψ−1. (14)
(all other parameters implicit in the definition of βa, Proof in Appendix, Section 10) This pins down
a simple condition for the adversary to defeat H.
Corollary 3 Under the conditions and with notations of Theorem 2, if there exists ε ∈ [0, 1] and
a ∈ A such that
βa ≤ 2ε`◦, (15)
then H is ε-defeated by A on `.
(Proof in Appendix, Section 10) We remark that whenever ` is canonical, g = Id and so
βa = γH,a(P,N, pi, 2L(1), 2L(0)). (16)
We also note that constants L(0), L(1) get out of the maximization problem in (10) so when ` is
canonical, the optimisation of γH,a does not depend on the loss at hand — hence, its optimisation by
an adversary could be done without knowing the loss that the learner is going to minimise. We also
remark that the condition for H to be ε-defeated by A does not involve an algorithmic component:
it means that any learning algorithm minimising loss ` will end up with a poor predictor if (15) is
satisfied, regardless of its computational resources.
. Relationships with integral probability metrics. In a special case, the somewhat abstract quantity
γgH,a can be related to the more familiar class of integral probability metrics (IPMs) [Sriperumbudur
et al., 2009]. The latter are a class of metrics on probability distributions, capturing e.g. the total
variation divergence, Wasserstein distance, and maximum mean discrepancy. The proof of the
following Corollary is immediate.
Corollary 4 Suppose γ`hard = 0 and H is closed by negation. Then
2 · βa
=max
h∈H
∣∣∣∣∫
X
g ◦ h ◦ a(x)dP (x)−
∫
X
g ◦ h ◦ a(x)dN(x)
∣∣∣∣ ,
which is the integral probability metric for the class {g ◦ h ◦ a : h ∈ H} on P and N . Here, g is
defined in (14).
We may now interpret Theorem 2 as saying: for an adversary to defeat a learner minimising a proper
loss, it suffices to make a suitable IPM between the class-conditionals P,N small. The particular
choice of IPM arises from the learner’s choice of hypothesis class, H. Of particular interest is when
this comprises kernelized scorers, as we now detail.
. Relationships with the maximum mean discrepancy. The maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) [Gret-
ton et al., 2006] corresponds to an IPM whereH is the unit-ball in an RKHS. We have the following
re-expression of γH,a for this hypothesis class, which turns out to involve the MMD.
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<latexit sha1_base64="w tmTXhhNI2oYYfUwnvjr4ov0ybU=">AAAL6nichVZfb9s 2EFf3t3P2p90e98LNMWA7jiulCNquMNB2WLeHrejaZs0W uQFFUTYRStRIqo5H8EtsT0P3uK+zD7Bvs6Ok2JbcrExs0 He/H3m8490xyjlT2vf/vfLW2++8+977Vz/o7Hz40cefX Lv+6U9KFJLQIyK4kMcRVpSzjB5ppjk9ziXFacTp8+jsa6 d//pJKxUT2TC9zOk3xLGMJI1iD6Hg3pJyf+run17r+2C8 H2p4E9aTr1ePx6fXOP2EsSJHSTBOOlToJ/FxPDZaaEU5 tJywUzTE5wzN6AtMMp1RNTWmwRT2QxCgREj6ZRqV0k2Fw qtQyjUa0IJiPonRU5DNJ6RlQU6znqg12wrUuowsi0hRns QlfUnsSTE0YpaYb2JZdOrk9NSzLC00zUpmVFBxpgZyvU MwkJZovYYKJZHAyROZYYqLBo81tnrKU02W5Va8TRnTGMq PZ2W85I7qQYIOCg9CJPw6CaQfB2GAPgZ4yoD/BMSuUNeB v26tQscQLdJIwzieRFIvsi8Cfor4/8geIMAmeRv0GedB DotCKxbTWl8u40csECE+Was4SPdn3xwcHwwYVkXSKTKhZ tkTgqh4qMmcgBBjpOVPOK4pSmFOkHA0l4AiI28UGdxHqV Ebns6SMBNUp+E2YkC7psTX++LC545AI1b/pD+zltJ9fR 1Ms26BtuIgscTZyvyeZyCg4qtx5VC60dhgE4ZCkg7tvpu //P/8Ss8+fulhbA/519BvBbf+yEy5rKER8WB13bdRJmRY TSeMRikWKWTap7Pmq/J4CbuX7nAuN+rC1HZmV0A2Ic7D XDYbOZtRDZfDXIVwirOpgxpRA3VBUNelADca3IACVpcO+ 830/PN8rbRjcqA87GOxX5oNXQgoJsXn3ex34h9FIGKq0N fVtC51TZGqczKXoJk7k2zgna+MihtUWsBS2kS+xZDgjd AsNCtusEAbzmYDEn6eXiBlpKtyxm5IyiKOqxOmIgzKmCR TrUmC+lXhpzaz89sd3WpamFGdKzYFoTWm1pup1ELsJ3dt rQTQUrLoI1gfV0oacJrrfDULJZnM9aK+KtWQrUiTOYRV 6rhUxIZRazstS2vZrLkUETg0XedMD5aYqaVt+bCt7VGKO 20s9WusetXVP1ronbd3Dte5hW/dgrXvQ1inteuYa8BQA TUSW2ZUPYN7iF3lMucYLu5qeLl4PURsQ1d6EnufQb2ozo sh8s+3itfJxWwn3iv5q3WHA8ZLyVbjH1pqJO1Gn0f0SCT 05pXou4skzdvbL1KRxKYthYZhW91TpJafmh+VDp7Gmak v84gJP3NUdlTJoO1Q6xYLFej45yHUll6LIYiJkRuXEvRE qKcvgtxZ5iiW0SuiLh+HFM0adsXwDFAmt3RHfhCsvcg1r 7ePu+obGdpo5K1lKOKx1Xr1OWkG5rxei7utQmMtkuOjN NAnvzzFPut0A3M9SiJ8EA0sHIBC6F9TBIU1DiAY+r0u7u 0RV8ke8cPni9narwoML2m+54J5Fvi2TrNcmQTvY4NT4fc C7vzXHFd1WGZhTjefYXS93JLPrnkSV1O7a3RcmnCtwCT XQMvybJLVoCPLmGlLKFT3eta1ihoU1cha5SuaP4OyH7su 37cqv8RLQqshdRuFiu4rkEDGhXKbA47SlJpGzAG5UddfM 91uZCi9FDFOg5syufr6oFjtdlTMo/AbecjGUMQRLwAM4 aD93tydHB+M74+DHg+69B/VL+Kr3ufel1/cC75Z3z/vOe +wdecTj3u/eK++vnXTnj50/d15V0Leu1JzPvMbY+fs/1t 8vxg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="w tmTXhhNI2oYYfUwnvjr4ov0ybU=">AAAL6nichVZfb9s 2EFf3t3P2p90e98LNMWA7jiulCNquMNB2WLeHrejaZs0W uQFFUTYRStRIqo5H8EtsT0P3uK+zD7Bvs6Ok2JbcrExs0 He/H3m8490xyjlT2vf/vfLW2++8+977Vz/o7Hz40cefX Lv+6U9KFJLQIyK4kMcRVpSzjB5ppjk9ziXFacTp8+jsa6 d//pJKxUT2TC9zOk3xLGMJI1iD6Hg3pJyf+run17r+2C8 H2p4E9aTr1ePx6fXOP2EsSJHSTBOOlToJ/FxPDZaaEU5 tJywUzTE5wzN6AtMMp1RNTWmwRT2QxCgREj6ZRqV0k2Fw qtQyjUa0IJiPonRU5DNJ6RlQU6znqg12wrUuowsi0hRns QlfUnsSTE0YpaYb2JZdOrk9NSzLC00zUpmVFBxpgZyvU MwkJZovYYKJZHAyROZYYqLBo81tnrKU02W5Va8TRnTGMq PZ2W85I7qQYIOCg9CJPw6CaQfB2GAPgZ4yoD/BMSuUNeB v26tQscQLdJIwzieRFIvsi8Cfor4/8geIMAmeRv0GedB DotCKxbTWl8u40csECE+Was4SPdn3xwcHwwYVkXSKTKhZ tkTgqh4qMmcgBBjpOVPOK4pSmFOkHA0l4AiI28UGdxHqV Ebns6SMBNUp+E2YkC7psTX++LC545AI1b/pD+zltJ9fR 1Ms26BtuIgscTZyvyeZyCg4qtx5VC60dhgE4ZCkg7tvpu //P/8Ss8+fulhbA/519BvBbf+yEy5rKER8WB13bdRJmRY TSeMRikWKWTap7Pmq/J4CbuX7nAuN+rC1HZmV0A2Ic7D XDYbOZtRDZfDXIVwirOpgxpRA3VBUNelADca3IACVpcO+ 830/PN8rbRjcqA87GOxX5oNXQgoJsXn3ex34h9FIGKq0N fVtC51TZGqczKXoJk7k2zgna+MihtUWsBS2kS+xZDgjd AsNCtusEAbzmYDEn6eXiBlpKtyxm5IyiKOqxOmIgzKmCR TrUmC+lXhpzaz89sd3WpamFGdKzYFoTWm1pup1ELsJ3dt rQTQUrLoI1gfV0oacJrrfDULJZnM9aK+KtWQrUiTOYRV 6rhUxIZRazstS2vZrLkUETg0XedMD5aYqaVt+bCt7VGKO 20s9WusetXVP1ronbd3Dte5hW/dgrXvQ1inteuYa8BQA TUSW2ZUPYN7iF3lMucYLu5qeLl4PURsQ1d6EnufQb2ozo sh8s+3itfJxWwn3iv5q3WHA8ZLyVbjH1pqJO1Gn0f0SCT 05pXou4skzdvbL1KRxKYthYZhW91TpJafmh+VDp7Gmak v84gJP3NUdlTJoO1Q6xYLFej45yHUll6LIYiJkRuXEvRE qKcvgtxZ5iiW0SuiLh+HFM0adsXwDFAmt3RHfhCsvcg1r 7ePu+obGdpo5K1lKOKx1Xr1OWkG5rxei7utQmMtkuOjN NAnvzzFPut0A3M9SiJ8EA0sHIBC6F9TBIU1DiAY+r0u7u 0RV8ke8cPni9narwoML2m+54J5Fvi2TrNcmQTvY4NT4fc C7vzXHFd1WGZhTjefYXS93JLPrnkSV1O7a3RcmnCtwCT XQMvybJLVoCPLmGlLKFT3eta1ihoU1cha5SuaP4OyH7su 37cqv8RLQqshdRuFiu4rkEDGhXKbA47SlJpGzAG5UddfM 91uZCi9FDFOg5syufr6oFjtdlTMo/AbecjGUMQRLwAM4 aD93tydHB+M74+DHg+69B/VL+Kr3ufel1/cC75Z3z/vOe +wdecTj3u/eK++vnXTnj50/d15V0Leu1JzPvMbY+fs/1t 8vxg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="w tmTXhhNI2oYYfUwnvjr4ov0ybU=">AAAL6nichVZfb9s 2EFf3t3P2p90e98LNMWA7jiulCNquMNB2WLeHrejaZs0W uQFFUTYRStRIqo5H8EtsT0P3uK+zD7Bvs6Ok2JbcrExs0 He/H3m8490xyjlT2vf/vfLW2++8+977Vz/o7Hz40cefX Lv+6U9KFJLQIyK4kMcRVpSzjB5ppjk9ziXFacTp8+jsa6 d//pJKxUT2TC9zOk3xLGMJI1iD6Hg3pJyf+run17r+2C8 H2p4E9aTr1ePx6fXOP2EsSJHSTBOOlToJ/FxPDZaaEU5 tJywUzTE5wzN6AtMMp1RNTWmwRT2QxCgREj6ZRqV0k2Fw qtQyjUa0IJiPonRU5DNJ6RlQU6znqg12wrUuowsi0hRns QlfUnsSTE0YpaYb2JZdOrk9NSzLC00zUpmVFBxpgZyvU MwkJZovYYKJZHAyROZYYqLBo81tnrKU02W5Va8TRnTGMq PZ2W85I7qQYIOCg9CJPw6CaQfB2GAPgZ4yoD/BMSuUNeB v26tQscQLdJIwzieRFIvsi8Cfor4/8geIMAmeRv0GedB DotCKxbTWl8u40csECE+Was4SPdn3xwcHwwYVkXSKTKhZ tkTgqh4qMmcgBBjpOVPOK4pSmFOkHA0l4AiI28UGdxHqV Ebns6SMBNUp+E2YkC7psTX++LC545AI1b/pD+zltJ9fR 1Ms26BtuIgscTZyvyeZyCg4qtx5VC60dhgE4ZCkg7tvpu //P/8Ss8+fulhbA/519BvBbf+yEy5rKER8WB13bdRJmRY TSeMRikWKWTap7Pmq/J4CbuX7nAuN+rC1HZmV0A2Ic7D XDYbOZtRDZfDXIVwirOpgxpRA3VBUNelADca3IACVpcO+ 830/PN8rbRjcqA87GOxX5oNXQgoJsXn3ex34h9FIGKq0N fVtC51TZGqczKXoJk7k2zgna+MihtUWsBS2kS+xZDgjd AsNCtusEAbzmYDEn6eXiBlpKtyxm5IyiKOqxOmIgzKmCR TrUmC+lXhpzaz89sd3WpamFGdKzYFoTWm1pup1ELsJ3dt rQTQUrLoI1gfV0oacJrrfDULJZnM9aK+KtWQrUiTOYRV 6rhUxIZRazstS2vZrLkUETg0XedMD5aYqaVt+bCt7VGKO 20s9WusetXVP1ronbd3Dte5hW/dgrXvQ1inteuYa8BQA TUSW2ZUPYN7iF3lMucYLu5qeLl4PURsQ1d6EnufQb2ozo sh8s+3itfJxWwn3iv5q3WHA8ZLyVbjH1pqJO1Gn0f0SCT 05pXou4skzdvbL1KRxKYthYZhW91TpJafmh+VDp7Gmak v84gJP3NUdlTJoO1Q6xYLFej45yHUll6LIYiJkRuXEvRE qKcvgtxZ5iiW0SuiLh+HFM0adsXwDFAmt3RHfhCsvcg1r 7ePu+obGdpo5K1lKOKx1Xr1OWkG5rxei7utQmMtkuOjN NAnvzzFPut0A3M9SiJ8EA0sHIBC6F9TBIU1DiAY+r0u7u 0RV8ke8cPni9narwoML2m+54J5Fvi2TrNcmQTvY4NT4fc C7vzXHFd1WGZhTjefYXS93JLPrnkSV1O7a3RcmnCtwCT XQMvybJLVoCPLmGlLKFT3eta1ihoU1cha5SuaP4OyH7su 37cqv8RLQqshdRuFiu4rkEDGhXKbA47SlJpGzAG5UddfM 91uZCi9FDFOg5syufr6oFjtdlTMo/AbecjGUMQRLwAM4 aD93tydHB+M74+DHg+69B/VL+Kr3ufel1/cC75Z3z/vOe +wdecTj3u/eK++vnXTnj50/d15V0Leu1JzPvMbY+fs/1t 8vxg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="w tmTXhhNI2oYYfUwnvjr4ov0ybU=">AAAL6nichVZfb9s 2EFf3t3P2p90e98LNMWA7jiulCNquMNB2WLeHrejaZs0W uQFFUTYRStRIqo5H8EtsT0P3uK+zD7Bvs6Ok2JbcrExs0 He/H3m8490xyjlT2vf/vfLW2++8+977Vz/o7Hz40cefX Lv+6U9KFJLQIyK4kMcRVpSzjB5ppjk9ziXFacTp8+jsa6 d//pJKxUT2TC9zOk3xLGMJI1iD6Hg3pJyf+run17r+2C8 H2p4E9aTr1ePx6fXOP2EsSJHSTBOOlToJ/FxPDZaaEU5 tJywUzTE5wzN6AtMMp1RNTWmwRT2QxCgREj6ZRqV0k2Fw qtQyjUa0IJiPonRU5DNJ6RlQU6znqg12wrUuowsi0hRns QlfUnsSTE0YpaYb2JZdOrk9NSzLC00zUpmVFBxpgZyvU MwkJZovYYKJZHAyROZYYqLBo81tnrKU02W5Va8TRnTGMq PZ2W85I7qQYIOCg9CJPw6CaQfB2GAPgZ4yoD/BMSuUNeB v26tQscQLdJIwzieRFIvsi8Cfor4/8geIMAmeRv0GedB DotCKxbTWl8u40csECE+Was4SPdn3xwcHwwYVkXSKTKhZ tkTgqh4qMmcgBBjpOVPOK4pSmFOkHA0l4AiI28UGdxHqV Ebns6SMBNUp+E2YkC7psTX++LC545AI1b/pD+zltJ9fR 1Ms26BtuIgscTZyvyeZyCg4qtx5VC60dhgE4ZCkg7tvpu //P/8Ss8+fulhbA/519BvBbf+yEy5rKER8WB13bdRJmRY TSeMRikWKWTap7Pmq/J4CbuX7nAuN+rC1HZmV0A2Ic7D XDYbOZtRDZfDXIVwirOpgxpRA3VBUNelADca3IACVpcO+ 830/PN8rbRjcqA87GOxX5oNXQgoJsXn3ex34h9FIGKq0N fVtC51TZGqczKXoJk7k2zgna+MihtUWsBS2kS+xZDgjd AsNCtusEAbzmYDEn6eXiBlpKtyxm5IyiKOqxOmIgzKmCR TrUmC+lXhpzaz89sd3WpamFGdKzYFoTWm1pup1ELsJ3dt rQTQUrLoI1gfV0oacJrrfDULJZnM9aK+KtWQrUiTOYRV 6rhUxIZRazstS2vZrLkUETg0XedMD5aYqaVt+bCt7VGKO 20s9WusetXVP1ronbd3Dte5hW/dgrXvQ1inteuYa8BQA TUSW2ZUPYN7iF3lMucYLu5qeLl4PURsQ1d6EnufQb2ozo sh8s+3itfJxWwn3iv5q3WHA8ZLyVbjH1pqJO1Gn0f0SCT 05pXou4skzdvbL1KRxKYthYZhW91TpJafmh+VDp7Gmak v84gJP3NUdlTJoO1Q6xYLFej45yHUll6LIYiJkRuXEvRE qKcvgtxZ5iiW0SuiLh+HFM0adsXwDFAmt3RHfhCsvcg1r 7ePu+obGdpo5K1lKOKx1Xr1OWkG5rxei7utQmMtkuOjN NAnvzzFPut0A3M9SiJ8EA0sHIBC6F9TBIU1DiAY+r0u7u 0RV8ke8cPni9narwoML2m+54J5Fvi2TrNcmQTvY4NT4fc C7vzXHFd1WGZhTjefYXS93JLPrnkSV1O7a3RcmnCtwCT XQMvybJLVoCPLmGlLKFT3eta1ihoU1cha5SuaP4OyH7su 37cqv8RLQqshdRuFiu4rkEDGhXKbA47SlJpGzAG5UddfM 91uZCi9FDFOg5syufr6oFjtdlTMo/AbecjGUMQRLwAM4 aD93tydHB+M74+DHg+69B/VL+Kr3ufel1/cC75Z3z/vOe +wdecTj3u/eK++vnXTnj50/d15V0Leu1JzPvMbY+fs/1t 8vxg==</latexit>
mmd⇡
<latexit sha1_base64=" xFaS5wP/SHs0+mWBINmfACG414E=">AAACZXicdVDL bhMxFHWGVwlQ0oLYsGBEisQiimamUUMlFhVsWLAoEq GVOmHk8dymVvyS7SmJRv4Vtu0v8Qd8BnfaUNFIXMnS 8Tn3HFunNII7nyS/OtGdu/fuP9h42H30+Mnm097W9je na8tgwrTQ9rikDgRXMPHcCzg2FqgsBRyV84+tfnQO1 nGtvvqlgamkM8VPOaMeqaK3vZN7WHjHGimrUOSG7xS 9fjLcf7eXjfbiZJgk4zRLW5CNR7ujOEWmnT5ZzWGx1 XmfV5rVEpRngjp3kibGTxtqPWcCQjevHRjK5nQGJwgV leCmzdXnQ/wGmSo+1RaP8vEV+6+jodK5pSwHUDMqBq Uc1GZmAeZoldSfufXllrzRurmCH0xLSVXV5J4uMd3V JrS4DrdVY7UBK7RzKIMQazIrLfK1qnAH224+h7AWjx +jCNFqeLi5fr8OK5pclnqBD3O1bM6orUIIMUZg339Lj f8PJtlwf5h+yfoHH1bFb5CX5DV5S1IyJgfkEzkkE8L IgvwkF+Sy8zvajJ5HL65Xo87K84zcmujVHxvRvgg=< /latexit><latexit sha1_base64=" xFaS5wP/SHs0+mWBINmfACG414E=">AAACZXicdVDL bhMxFHWGVwlQ0oLYsGBEisQiimamUUMlFhVsWLAoEq GVOmHk8dymVvyS7SmJRv4Vtu0v8Qd8BnfaUNFIXMnS 8Tn3HFunNII7nyS/OtGdu/fuP9h42H30+Mnm097W9je na8tgwrTQ9rikDgRXMPHcCzg2FqgsBRyV84+tfnQO1 nGtvvqlgamkM8VPOaMeqaK3vZN7WHjHGimrUOSG7xS 9fjLcf7eXjfbiZJgk4zRLW5CNR7ujOEWmnT5ZzWGx1 XmfV5rVEpRngjp3kibGTxtqPWcCQjevHRjK5nQGJwgV leCmzdXnQ/wGmSo+1RaP8vEV+6+jodK5pSwHUDMqBq Uc1GZmAeZoldSfufXllrzRurmCH0xLSVXV5J4uMd3V JrS4DrdVY7UBK7RzKIMQazIrLfK1qnAH224+h7AWjx +jCNFqeLi5fr8OK5pclnqBD3O1bM6orUIIMUZg339Lj f8PJtlwf5h+yfoHH1bFb5CX5DV5S1IyJgfkEzkkE8L IgvwkF+Sy8zvajJ5HL65Xo87K84zcmujVHxvRvgg=< /latexit><latexit sha1_base64=" xFaS5wP/SHs0+mWBINmfACG414E=">AAACZXicdVDL bhMxFHWGVwlQ0oLYsGBEisQiimamUUMlFhVsWLAoEq GVOmHk8dymVvyS7SmJRv4Vtu0v8Qd8BnfaUNFIXMnS 8Tn3HFunNII7nyS/OtGdu/fuP9h42H30+Mnm097W9je na8tgwrTQ9rikDgRXMPHcCzg2FqgsBRyV84+tfnQO1 nGtvvqlgamkM8VPOaMeqaK3vZN7WHjHGimrUOSG7xS 9fjLcf7eXjfbiZJgk4zRLW5CNR7ujOEWmnT5ZzWGx1 XmfV5rVEpRngjp3kibGTxtqPWcCQjevHRjK5nQGJwgV leCmzdXnQ/wGmSo+1RaP8vEV+6+jodK5pSwHUDMqBq Uc1GZmAeZoldSfufXllrzRurmCH0xLSVXV5J4uMd3V JrS4DrdVY7UBK7RzKIMQazIrLfK1qnAH224+h7AWjx +jCNFqeLi5fr8OK5pclnqBD3O1bM6orUIIMUZg339Lj f8PJtlwf5h+yfoHH1bFb5CX5DV5S1IyJgfkEzkkE8L IgvwkF+Sy8zvajJ5HL65Xo87K84zcmujVHxvRvgg=< /latexit><latexit sha1_base64=" xFaS5wP/SHs0+mWBINmfACG414E=">AAACZXicdVDL bhMxFHWGVwlQ0oLYsGBEisQiimamUUMlFhVsWLAoEq GVOmHk8dymVvyS7SmJRv4Vtu0v8Qd8BnfaUNFIXMnS 8Tn3HFunNII7nyS/OtGdu/fuP9h42H30+Mnm097W9je na8tgwrTQ9rikDgRXMPHcCzg2FqgsBRyV84+tfnQO1 nGtvvqlgamkM8VPOaMeqaK3vZN7WHjHGimrUOSG7xS 9fjLcf7eXjfbiZJgk4zRLW5CNR7ujOEWmnT5ZzWGx1 XmfV5rVEpRngjp3kibGTxtqPWcCQjevHRjK5nQGJwgV leCmzdXnQ/wGmSo+1RaP8vEV+6+jodK5pSwHUDMqBq Uc1GZmAeZoldSfufXllrzRurmCH0xLSVXV5J4uMd3V JrS4DrdVY7UBK7RzKIMQazIrLfK1qnAH224+h7AWjx +jCNFqeLi5fr8OK5pclnqBD3O1bM6orUIIMUZg339Lj f8PJtlwf5h+yfoHH1bFb5CX5DV5S1IyJgfkEzkkE8L IgvwkF+Sy8zvajJ5HL65Xo87K84zcmujVHxvRvgg=< /latexit>
 `hard
<latexit sha1_base64="vZXIq rvSSg/IK6/H5ibVoaSIg/A=">AAACf3icdVHLbhMxFHWmPEp4NIU lmxEpUhfRyBNR2tlVZcOCRZEILcqEyPbcplb8kh+FaOQv6bZ8FH+D 0wZoiriSpXPPuS/fS43gzmP8s5Nt3Lv/4OHmo+7jJ0+fbfW2n392 OlgGI6aFtqeUOBBcwchzL+DUWCCSCjih83dL/eQCrONaffILAxNJZ oqfcUZ8oqa9rZ06mBmRkoAQhu9Me31cDPdwtX+Q42IPl9WbYQIYH 1RvcV4msLQ+WtnxdLvzpW40CxKUZ4I4Ny6x8ZOWWM+ZgNitgwND2J zMYJygIhLcpL2ePOavE9PkZ9qmp3x+zd7OaIl0biHpAAIjYkDlIE 1rAeYpVRJ/7u4GL8m/moJvTKe/qaatLyCOy0lbU9n2yxi766oni9T aBROXOMR11VhtwArtXJLTou7IjNrEB9WkmHSH9sM/5W/vOP5xv94 Um7a1pPp7aszVoj0ntokx5qlEOsbvjef/B6NhURXlx2H/8Gh1lU30 Er1Cu6hE++gQvUfHaIQYCugSXaEfWZbtZkWGb0KzzirnBVqzrPoF WRLHUQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vZXIq rvSSg/IK6/H5ibVoaSIg/A=">AAACf3icdVHLbhMxFHWmPEp4NIU lmxEpUhfRyBNR2tlVZcOCRZEILcqEyPbcplb8kh+FaOQv6bZ8FH+D 0wZoiriSpXPPuS/fS43gzmP8s5Nt3Lv/4OHmo+7jJ0+fbfW2n392 OlgGI6aFtqeUOBBcwchzL+DUWCCSCjih83dL/eQCrONaffILAxNJZ oqfcUZ8oqa9rZ06mBmRkoAQhu9Me31cDPdwtX+Q42IPl9WbYQIYH 1RvcV4msLQ+WtnxdLvzpW40CxKUZ4I4Ny6x8ZOWWM+ZgNitgwND2J zMYJygIhLcpL2ePOavE9PkZ9qmp3x+zd7OaIl0biHpAAIjYkDlIE 1rAeYpVRJ/7u4GL8m/moJvTKe/qaatLyCOy0lbU9n2yxi766oni9T aBROXOMR11VhtwArtXJLTou7IjNrEB9WkmHSH9sM/5W/vOP5xv94 Um7a1pPp7aszVoj0ntokx5qlEOsbvjef/B6NhURXlx2H/8Gh1lU30 Er1Cu6hE++gQvUfHaIQYCugSXaEfWZbtZkWGb0KzzirnBVqzrPoF WRLHUQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vZXIq rvSSg/IK6/H5ibVoaSIg/A=">AAACf3icdVHLbhMxFHWmPEp4NIU lmxEpUhfRyBNR2tlVZcOCRZEILcqEyPbcplb8kh+FaOQv6bZ8FH+D 0wZoiriSpXPPuS/fS43gzmP8s5Nt3Lv/4OHmo+7jJ0+fbfW2n392 OlgGI6aFtqeUOBBcwchzL+DUWCCSCjih83dL/eQCrONaffILAxNJZ oqfcUZ8oqa9rZ06mBmRkoAQhu9Me31cDPdwtX+Q42IPl9WbYQIYH 1RvcV4msLQ+WtnxdLvzpW40CxKUZ4I4Ny6x8ZOWWM+ZgNitgwND2J zMYJygIhLcpL2ePOavE9PkZ9qmp3x+zd7OaIl0biHpAAIjYkDlIE 1rAeYpVRJ/7u4GL8m/moJvTKe/qaatLyCOy0lbU9n2yxi766oni9T aBROXOMR11VhtwArtXJLTou7IjNrEB9WkmHSH9sM/5W/vOP5xv94 Um7a1pPp7aszVoj0ntokx5qlEOsbvjef/B6NhURXlx2H/8Gh1lU30 Er1Cu6hE++gQvUfHaIQYCugSXaEfWZbtZkWGb0KzzirnBVqzrPoF WRLHUQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vZXIq rvSSg/IK6/H5ibVoaSIg/A=">AAACf3icdVHLbhMxFHWmPEp4NIU lmxEpUhfRyBNR2tlVZcOCRZEILcqEyPbcplb8kh+FaOQv6bZ8FH+D 0wZoiriSpXPPuS/fS43gzmP8s5Nt3Lv/4OHmo+7jJ0+fbfW2n392 OlgGI6aFtqeUOBBcwchzL+DUWCCSCjih83dL/eQCrONaffILAxNJZ oqfcUZ8oqa9rZ06mBmRkoAQhu9Me31cDPdwtX+Q42IPl9WbYQIYH 1RvcV4msLQ+WtnxdLvzpW40CxKUZ4I4Ny6x8ZOWWM+ZgNitgwND2J zMYJygIhLcpL2ePOavE9PkZ9qmp3x+zd7OaIl0biHpAAIjYkDlIE 1rAeYpVRJ/7u4GL8m/moJvTKe/qaatLyCOy0lbU9n2yxi766oni9T aBROXOMR11VhtwArtXJLTou7IjNrEB9WkmHSH9sM/5W/vOP5xv94 Um7a1pPp7aszVoj0ntokx5qlEOsbvjef/B6NhURXlx2H/8Gh1lU30 Er1Cu6hE++gQvUfHaIQYCugSXaEfWZbtZkWGb0KzzirnBVqzrPoF WRLHUQ==</latexit>
4"`0
<latexit sha1_base64="O 2PEfkGBuvWr5vQMG6pfyRBNoCk=">AAACaHicdVDLahs xFJUnfaROH3ZCCaWbIU6hCzNo0gzNQBeh2XTRRQJxE8i4 g0Zz4wjrhaRJawZ9TLftF/Ub+hOVHSc0hl4QHJ1zz5E4l ebMOox/d6K1Bw8fPV5/0t14+uz5i15/84tVjaEwooorc 14RC5xJGDnmOJxrA0RUHM6q6dFcP7sGY5mSp26mYSzIRL JLRokLVNl7ubtfXBMD2jKuZFwA5yXeLXsDnOAsz1Ic4yT Daf5uDvL8YD/L4jTBixmg5RyX/c6Hola0ESAd5cTaixR rN26JcYxy8N2isaAJnZIJXAQoiQA7bhf/9/GbwNTxpTLh SBcv2H8dLRHWzkQ1hIYSPqzEsNETAzANVkHclV1dnpN3W reQ8I0qIYis28KRWUi3jfZz3Pj7qjZKg+HK2iCHLlZkW pnAN7IOO6Hw9rP3K/HhYyTAYNXM312/3oSVbSEq9T08zO SsvSKm9t7HISL0fVtq/H8w2kvyJD3ZGxx+XBa/jl6jHfQ Wpeg9OkSf0DEaIYpa9AP9RL86f6J+tB29ulmNOkvPFro 30c5fXpe+jA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="O 2PEfkGBuvWr5vQMG6pfyRBNoCk=">AAACaHicdVDLahs xFJUnfaROH3ZCCaWbIU6hCzNo0gzNQBeh2XTRRQJxE8i4 g0Zz4wjrhaRJawZ9TLftF/Ub+hOVHSc0hl4QHJ1zz5E4l ebMOox/d6K1Bw8fPV5/0t14+uz5i15/84tVjaEwooorc 14RC5xJGDnmOJxrA0RUHM6q6dFcP7sGY5mSp26mYSzIRL JLRokLVNl7ubtfXBMD2jKuZFwA5yXeLXsDnOAsz1Ic4yT Daf5uDvL8YD/L4jTBixmg5RyX/c6Hola0ESAd5cTaixR rN26JcYxy8N2isaAJnZIJXAQoiQA7bhf/9/GbwNTxpTLh SBcv2H8dLRHWzkQ1hIYSPqzEsNETAzANVkHclV1dnpN3W reQ8I0qIYis28KRWUi3jfZz3Pj7qjZKg+HK2iCHLlZkW pnAN7IOO6Hw9rP3K/HhYyTAYNXM312/3oSVbSEq9T08zO SsvSKm9t7HISL0fVtq/H8w2kvyJD3ZGxx+XBa/jl6jHfQ Wpeg9OkSf0DEaIYpa9AP9RL86f6J+tB29ulmNOkvPFro 30c5fXpe+jA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="O 2PEfkGBuvWr5vQMG6pfyRBNoCk=">AAACaHicdVDLahs xFJUnfaROH3ZCCaWbIU6hCzNo0gzNQBeh2XTRRQJxE8i4 g0Zz4wjrhaRJawZ9TLftF/Ub+hOVHSc0hl4QHJ1zz5E4l ebMOox/d6K1Bw8fPV5/0t14+uz5i15/84tVjaEwooorc 14RC5xJGDnmOJxrA0RUHM6q6dFcP7sGY5mSp26mYSzIRL JLRokLVNl7ubtfXBMD2jKuZFwA5yXeLXsDnOAsz1Ic4yT Daf5uDvL8YD/L4jTBixmg5RyX/c6Hola0ESAd5cTaixR rN26JcYxy8N2isaAJnZIJXAQoiQA7bhf/9/GbwNTxpTLh SBcv2H8dLRHWzkQ1hIYSPqzEsNETAzANVkHclV1dnpN3W reQ8I0qIYis28KRWUi3jfZz3Pj7qjZKg+HK2iCHLlZkW pnAN7IOO6Hw9rP3K/HhYyTAYNXM312/3oSVbSEq9T08zO SsvSKm9t7HISL0fVtq/H8w2kvyJD3ZGxx+XBa/jl6jHfQ Wpeg9OkSf0DEaIYpa9AP9RL86f6J+tB29ulmNOkvPFro 30c5fXpe+jA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="O 2PEfkGBuvWr5vQMG6pfyRBNoCk=">AAACaHicdVDLahs xFJUnfaROH3ZCCaWbIU6hCzNo0gzNQBeh2XTRRQJxE8i4 g0Zz4wjrhaRJawZ9TLftF/Ub+hOVHSc0hl4QHJ1zz5E4l ebMOox/d6K1Bw8fPV5/0t14+uz5i15/84tVjaEwooorc 14RC5xJGDnmOJxrA0RUHM6q6dFcP7sGY5mSp26mYSzIRL JLRokLVNl7ubtfXBMD2jKuZFwA5yXeLXsDnOAsz1Ic4yT Daf5uDvL8YD/L4jTBixmg5RyX/c6Hola0ESAd5cTaixR rN26JcYxy8N2isaAJnZIJXAQoiQA7bhf/9/GbwNTxpTLh SBcv2H8dLRHWzkQ1hIYSPqzEsNETAzANVkHclV1dnpN3W reQ8I0qIYis28KRWUi3jfZz3Pj7qjZKg+HK2iCHLlZkW pnAN7IOO6Hw9rP3K/HhYyTAYNXM312/3oSVbSEq9T08zO SsvSKm9t7HISL0fVtq/H8w2kvyJD3ZGxx+XBa/jl6jHfQ Wpeg9OkSf0DEaIYpa9AP9RL86f6J+tB29ulmNOkvPFro 30c5fXpe+jA==</latexit>
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Figure 1: Suppose an adversary a can guarantee an upperbound on MMDpi as displayed in thick
red. For some fixed `(L) and ε, we display the range of pi values (in pink) for which a ε-defeats H.
Notice that outside this interval, it may not be possible for a to ε-defeat H (in grey, tagged "?"), and
if pi is large enough (orange, tagged "safe"), then it is not possible for condition (15) to be satisfied
anymore.
Corollary 5 Suppose ` is proper canonical and let H denote the unit ball of a reproducing kernel
Hilbert space (RKHS) of functions with reproducing kernel κ. Denote
µa,Q
.
=
∫
X
κ(a(x), .)dQ(x) (17)
the adversarial mean embedding of a on Q. If pi = 1/2 and γ`hard = 0, then
2 · βa = 1
2
· ‖µa,P − µa,N‖H. (18)
The constraints on pi,γ`hard are for readability: the proof (in Appendix, Section 11) shows a more
general result, with unrestricted pi,γ`hard. The right-hand side of (18) is proportional to the MMD
between P and N . In the more general case, the right-hand side of (18) is replaced by MMDpi
.
=
‖pi ·µa,P − (1−pi) ·µa,N‖H. Figure 1 displays an example picture (for unrestricted pi,γ`hard) for some
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canonical proper but asymmetric loss (L(0) 6= L(1)) when an adversary with a given upperbound
guarantee on MMDpi can indeed ε-defeat some H. We remark that while this may be possible for a
whole range of pi, this may not be possible for all. The picture would be different if the loss were
symmetric (Corollary 6 below), since in this case a guarantee to ε-defeat H for some pi would imply
a guarantee for all. Loss asymmetry thus brings a difficulty for the adversary which, we recall,
cannot act on pi.
. Simultaneously defeating H over sets of losses. Satisfying (15) involves at least the knowledge
of one value of the loss, if not of the loss itself. It turns out that if the loss is canonical and the
adversary has just a partial knowledge of it, it may in fact still be possible for him to guess whether
(15) can be satisfied over this set, as we now show.
Corollary 6 Let L be a set of canonical proper losses satisfying the following property: ∀` ∈
L,∃L† ∈ R such that L(1) = L(0) .= L†. Assuming (H,A) integrable with respect to D, if
∃a ∈ A : γH,a(P,N, pi, 0, 0) ≤ ε · inf
`∈L
`◦ − L†, (19)
then H is jointly ε-defeated by A on all losses of L.
Notice that all the adversary needs to know is L. The result easily follows from remarking that we
have in this case:
βa = 2L
† + γH,a(P,N, pi, 0, 0),
which we then plug in (15) to get the statement of the Corollary. Corollary 6 is interesting for
two reasons. First, it applies to all proper symmetric losses [Nock and Nielsen, 2008, Reid and
Williamson, 2010], which includes popular losses like the square, logistic and Matsushita losses.
Finally, it does not just offer the adversarial strategy to defeat classifiers that would be learned on
any of such losses, it also applies to more sophisticated learning strategies that would tune the loss
at learning time [Nock and Nielsen, 2008, Reid and Williamson, 2010] or tailor the loss to specific
constraints [Buja et al., 2005].
5 Monge efficient adversaries
We now highlight a sufficient condition on adversaries for (15) to be satisfied, which considers
classifiers in the increasingly popular framework of "Lipschitz classification" for adversarial training
[Cissé et al., 2017], and turns out to frame adversaries in optimal transport (OT) theory [Villani,
2009]. We proceed in three steps, first framing OT adversaries, then Lipschitz classifiers and finally
showing how the former defeats the latter.
Definition 7 Given any c : X× X→ R and some δ ∈ Im(c), we say that A is δ-Monge efficient
for cost c on marginals P,N iff ∃a ∈ A : C(a, P,N) ≤ δ, with
C(a, P,N)
.
= inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
c(a(x), a(x′))dµ(x,x′),
and Π is the set of all joint probability measures whose marginals are P and N .
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Hence, Monge efficiency relates to an efficient compression of the transport plan between class
marginals. In fact, we should require c to satisfy some mild additional assumptions for the existence
of optimal couplings [Villani, 2009, Theorem 4.1], such as lower semicontinuity. We skip them for
the sake of simplicity, but note that infinite costs are possible without endangering the existence
of optimal couplings of (P,N) [Villani, 2009], which is convenient for the following generalized
notion of Lipschitz continuity.
Definition 8 Let c : X × X → R. For some K > 0 and u, v : R → R, set H is said to be
(u, v,K)-Lipschitz with respect to c iff
u ◦ h(x)− v ◦ h(y)≤K · c(x,y),∀h ∈ H,∀x,y ∈ X. (20)
We shall also write that H is K-Lipschitz if Definition 8 holds for u = v = Id (c implicit). Actual
Lipschitz continuity would restrict c to involve a distance, and the state of the art of adversarial
training would restrict further the distance to be based on a norm [Cissé et al., 2017]. Equipped
with this, we obtain the main result of this Section.
Theorem 9 Fix any ε > 0 and proper canonical loss `. Suppose ∃c : X× X→ R such that:
(1) H is 2K-Lipschitz with respect to c;
(2) A is δ-Monge efficient for cost c on marginals P,N for
δ ≤ 4ε`
◦ − 2γ`hard
K
. (21)
Then H is ε-defeated by A on `.
The proof (in Appendix, Section 12) is given for the more general case where pi is not necessarily
1/2 and any proper loss, not necessarily canonical. We also show in the proof that unless pi = 1/2, c
cannot be a distance in the general case. We take it as a potential difficulty for the adversary which,
we recall, cannot act on pi.
Theorem 9 is particularly interesting with respect to the current developing strategies around
adversarial training that "Lipschitzify" classifiers [Cissé et al., 2017]. Such strategies assume that
the loss ` is Lipschitz (remark that we do not make such an assumption). In short, if we rename `adv
the inner part (within [.]) in (5), those strategies exploit the fact that (omitting key parameters for
readability)
`adv(h) ≤ `clean(h) +K`Kh,∀h ∈ H, (22)
where `clean is the adversary-free loss and K. is the Lipschitz constant of the loss (`) or classifier
learned (h). One might think that minimizing (22) is not a good strategy in the light of Theorem
9 because the regularization enforces a minimization of Kh (K in Theorem 9), so we seemingly
alleviate constraints on the adversary to be δ-Monge efficient in (21) and can end up being more
easily defeated. This is however a too simplistic conclusion that does not take into account the other
parameters at play, as we now explain in the context of Cissé et al. [2017]. Consider the logistic
loss [Cissé et al., 2017], for which:
`◦ = K` = 1,γ`hard = 0. (23)
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Suppose we can reduce both `clean(h) andKh (which is in fact not hard to ensure for deep architectures
[Miyato et al., 2018, Section 2.1], [Cranko et al., 2018]) so that Kh ≤ (1 − `clean(h))/2 = (`◦ −
`clean(h))/(K` + `
◦). Reorganizing, we get `clean(h) +K`Kh ≤ (1−Kh)`◦, so forH to be ε-defeated,
we in fact get a constraint on ε: ε ≥ Kh, which reframes the constraint on δ in (21) as (see also
Appendix, (57)),
δ ≤ 4`◦ − γ
`
hard
Kh
= 4, (24)
which does not depend anymore on Kh.
The proof of Theorem 9 is followed in Appendix by a proof of an interesting generalization in
the light of those recent results [Cissé et al., 2017, Cranko et al., 2018, Miyato et al., 2018]: the
Monge efficieny requirement can be weakened under a form of dominance (similar to a Lipschitz
condition) of the canonical link with respect to the chosen link of the loss. We now provide a simple
family of Monge efficient adversaries.
. Mixup adversaries. Very recently, it was experimentally demonstrated how a simple modification
of a training sample yields models more likely to be robust to adversarial examples and generalize
better [Zhang et al., 2018]. The process can be summarized in a simple way: perform random
interpolation between two randomly chosen training examples to create a new example (repeat as
necessary). Since we do not allow the adversary to tamper with the class, we define as λ-mixup
(for λ ∈ [0, 1]) the process which creates for two observations x and x′ having a different class the
following adversarial observation (same class as x):
a(x)
.
= λ · x+ (1− λ) · x′. (25)
We make the assumption that X is metric with an associated distance that stems from this metric.
We analyze a very simple case of λ-mixup, which we call λ-mixup to x∗, which replaces x′ by some
x∗ in X in (25). Notice that as λ→ 0, we converge to the maximally harmful adversary mentioned
in the introduction. The intuition thus suggests that the set A of all λ-mixups to some x∗ (where we
vary λ) designs in fact an arbitrarily Monge efficient adversary, where the optimal transport problem
involves the associated distance of X. This is indeed true and in fact simple to show.
Lemma 10 For any δ > 0 the set of all λ-mixups to x∗ is δ-Monge efficient for λ ≤ δ/W1, where
W1 is the 1-Wasserstein distance between the class marginals.
(Proof in Appendix, Section 14) The mixup methodology as defined in Zhang et al. [2018] can be
specialized in numerous ways: for example, instead of mixing up with a single observation, we
could perform all possible mixups within S in a spirit closer to Zhang et al. [2018], or mixups with
several distinguished observations (e.g. after clustering), etc. . Many choices like these would be
eligible to be at least Monge efficient, but while they can be computationally simple to compute,
they are just surrogates for Monge efficiency: tackling directly the compression of the optimal
transport plan is a more direct option to Monge efficiency.
6 From weak to strong Monge efficiency
In Theorem 9, we showed how Monge efficiency for adversaries can "take over" Lipschitz classifiers
and defeat them for some ε > 0. Suppose now that the A we have is weak in that all its elements are
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α/d c/c c/a a/c a/a
0.15 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.02
0.30 0.03 0.25 0.00 0.12
0.45 0.03 0.48 0.01 0.55
0.60 0.03 0.74 0.20 0.96
Table 2: log loss USPS results. α/d is the strength of the adversary. The convention {a,c}/{a,c}
follows Figure 2. Bold faces denote results better than the c/c baseline.
Monge efficient but for large values of δ. In other words, we cannot satisfy condition (2) in Theorem
9. Is there another set of adversaries, A?, whose elements would combine the elements of A is a
computationally savvy way, and which would achieve any desired level of Monge efficiency? Such
a question parallels that of the boosting framework in supervised learning, in which one combines
classifiers just different from random to achieve a combination arbitrarily accurate [Schapire and
Freund, 2012].
We now answer our question by the affirmative, in the context of kernel machines. LetH denote
a RKHS and Φ a feature map of the RKHS. ∀f : X→ X, define cost
CΦ(f, P,N)
.
= inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
X
‖Φ ◦ f(x)− Φ ◦ f(x′)‖Hdµ(x,x′).
Definition 11 Function a : X→ X is said η-contractive for Φ, for some η > 0 iff ‖Φ ◦ a(x)− Φ ◦
a(x′)‖H ≤ (1− η) · ‖Φ(x)− Φ(x′)‖H,∀x,x′ ∈ X.
Set A is said η-contractive for Φ iff it contains at least one adversary η-contractive for Φ (and we
make no assumption on the others). Define now AJ .= {a ◦ a ◦ ... ◦ a (J times) : a ∈ A} for any
J ∈ N∗, andWΦ1 .= infµ∈Π(P,N)
∫
X
‖Φ(x)−Φ(x′)‖Hdµ(x,x′), the 1-Wasserstein distance between
class marginals in the feature map.
Theorem 12 Let H denote a RKHS with feature map Φ and A be η-contractive for Φ. Then A
is δ-Monge efficient for δ = (1 − η) ·WΦ1 . Furthermore, ∀δ > 0, AJ is δ-Monge efficient when
J ≥ (1/η) · log(WΦ1 /δ).
(Proof in Appendix, Section 13) To amplify the difference between A and AJ , remark that the worst
case of Monge efficiency is δ = WΦ1 , since it is just the Monge efficiency for contracting nothing.
So, as η → 0, there is barely any guarantee we can get from the η-contractive A while AJ can still
be arbitrarily Monge efficient for a J linear in the coding size of the Wasserstein distance between
class marginals.
7 Experiments
We have performed toy experiments to demonstrate our new setting. Our objective is not to
investigate the competition with respect to the wealth of results that have been recently published
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1D problem USPS handwritten digits
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
α
100
4× 10−1
6× 10−1
a/a
a/c
c/a
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
α
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
δ
0
200
400
600
800
‖w
‖ 2
Expected logistic loss Cost δ and weight norm ‖w‖2
transf. in digit-1 transf. in digit-3
0 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.6 0 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.6
Figure 2: Left: results for the 1D toy problem as a function of α. Left plot: the expected log
loss for the training/testing distribution pairs a/a, a/c, and c/a, where a (respectively c) denotes the
adversarial (clean) data distribution. Hence for a/c we optimised the logistic regression classifier
on the adversarial distribution, and computed the log loss on the clean distribution. Right plot: the
optimal transport cost δ (left scale) and the norm of the logistic regression weights ‖w‖2 (right
scale). Right: sample results of digits as they are transformed by the OT adversary (convention
follows Figure 1).
in the field, but rather to touch upon the interest that such a novel setting might have for further
experimental investigations. Compared to the state-of-the-art, ours is a clear two-stage setting
where we first compute the adversaries assuming relevant knowledge of the learner (in our case, we
rely on Theorem 12 and therefore assume that the adversary knows at least the cost c, see below),
and then we learn based on an adversarially transformed set of examples. This process has the
advantage over the direct minimization of (2) that it extracts the computation of the adversarial
examples from the training loop: we can generate once the adversarial examples, then store them
and / or share / reuse them to robustly train various models (recall that under a general Lipschitz
assumptions on classifiers, such examples can fit the adversarial training of different kinds of models,
see Theorem 9). This process is also reminiscent of the training process for invariant support vector
machines [DeCoste and Schölkopf, 2002] and can also be viewed as a particular form of vicinal
risk minimization [Chapelle et al., 2000]. We have performed two experiments: a 1D experiment
involving a particular Mixup adversary and a USPS experiment involving a closer proxy of the
optimal transport compression that we call Monge adversary.
. 1D experiment, mixup adversary. Our example involves the unit interval X = [0, 1] with
P (x) ∝ exp(−(x − 0.2)2/0.12) and N(x) ∝ exp(−(x − 0.6)2/0.22). We let A contain a single
deterministic mapping parametrised by α as A .= {a(x) .= (1− α)x+ αE(X,Y)∼DX}. Notice that
this adversary is just the (1− α)-mixup to the unconditional mean, following Section 6. We further
let H be the space of linear functions h(x) = w · (x, 1)>, w ∈ R2, which is the RKHS with
linear kernel κ(x,y) = x · y (assuming that x and y include the constant 1), and ‖h‖H = ‖w‖2.
The transport cost function of interest is c(x,y) = ‖x − y‖2. We discretize X to simplify the
computation of the OT cost. Results are summarized in Figure 2 (and Appendix). We theoretically
achieve loss `0 as α→ 1. There are several interesting observations from Figure 2: first, the mixup
adversary indeed works like a Monge efficient adversary: by tuning α, we can achieve any desired
level of Monge efficiency. The left plot completes in this simple case observations of Tsipras et al.
[2019], Zhang et al. [2018]: the worst result is consistently obtained for training on clean data and
testing on adversarial data, which indicates that our adversaries may be useful to get robustness
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using adversarial training.
. USPS digits, Monge adversary. We have picked 100 examples of each of the "1" and "3"
classes of the 8×8 pixel greyscale USPS handwritten digit dataset. The set of Monge adversaries is
A
.
= {a : R64 7→ R64 | ‖a(x)− x‖1 ≤ α}, in which, under the L1 budget constraint, we optimize
the Wasserstein distance W 22 between the empirical class marginals. We achieve this by combining
a generic gradient-free optimiser with a linear program solver2. We learn using logistic regression.
We demonstrate three strengths of adversary — namely α/d = 0.15, 0.30, 0.45, 0.6 where d is L1
distance between the (clean) class conditional means. Sample transformations as obtained by the
Monge adversary are displayed in Figure 2 (more in Appendix), and Table 2 provides log loss
values for different training / test schemes, following the scheme of the 1D data. It clearly emerges
two facts: (i) as the budget increases, the Monge adversary smoothly transforms digits in credible
adversarial examples, and (ii), as previously observed, training over a tight budget adversary tends
to increase generalization abilities Tsipras et al. [2019], Zhang et al. [2018].
8 Conclusion
It has been observed over the past years that classifiers can be extremely sensitive to changes in
inputs that would be imperceptible to humans. How such tightly limited resource-constrained
changes can affect and be so damaging to machine learning and how to find a cure has been growing
as a very intensive area of research. There is so far little understanding on the formal side and many
experimental approaches would rely on adversarial data that, in some way, shrinks the gap between
classes in a controlled way.
In this paper, we studied the intuition that such a process can indeed be beneficial for adversarial
training. Our answer involves a simple, sufficient (and sometimes loss-independent) property for
any given class of adversaries to be detrimental to learning. This property involves a measure of
“harmfulness”, which relates to (and generalizes) integral probability metrics and the maximum
mean discrepancy. We presented a sufficient condition for this sufficient property to hold for
Lipschitz classifiers, which relies on framing it into optimal transport theory. This brings a general
way to formalize how adversaries can indeed "shrink the gap" between classes with the objective to
be detrimental to learning. As an example, we delivered a negative boosting result which shows
how weakly contractive adversaries for a RKHS can be combined to build a maximally detrimental
adversary. We also provided justifications that several experimental approaches to adversarial
training involve proxies for adversaries like the ones we analyze. On the experimental side, we
provided a simple toy assessment of the ways one can compute and then use such adversaries in a
two-stage process.
Our experimental results, even when carried out on a toy domain, bring additional reasons to
consider such adversaries, this time from a generalization standpoint: our results might indeed
indicate that they could at least be useful to gain additional robustness in generalization.
2Code available upon request to CW
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9 Appendix
10 Proof of Theorem 2 and Corollary 3
Our proof assumes basic knowledge about proper losses (see for example Reid and Williamson
[2010]). From [Reid and Williamson, 2010, Theorem 1, Corollary 3] and Shuford et al. [1966], `
being twice differentiable and proper, its conditional Bayes risk L and partial losses `1 and `−1 are
related by:
−L′′(c) = `
′
−1(c)
c
= − `
′
1(c)
1− c ,∀c ∈ (0, 1). (26)
The weight function [Reid and Williamson, 2010, Theorem 1] being also w = −L′′, we get from
the integral representation of partial losses [Reid and Williamson, 2010, eq. (5)],
`1(c) = −
∫ 1
c
(1− u)L′′(u)du, (27)
from which we derive by integrating by parts and then using the Legendre conjugate of −L,
`1(c) + L(1) = − [(1− u)L′(u)]1c −
∫ 1
c
L′(u)du+ L(1)
= (1− c)L′(c) + L(c)− L(1) + L(1) (28)
= −(−L′)(c) + c · (−L′)(c)− (−L)(c)
= −(−L′)(c) + (−L)?((−L)′(c)). (29)
Now, suppose that the way a real-valued prediction v is fit in the loss is through a general inverse
link ψ−1 : R→ (0, 1). Let
v`,ψ
.
= (−L′) ◦ ψ−1(v). (30)
Since (−L)′−1(v`,ψ) = ψ−1(v), the proper composite loss ` with link ψ on prediction v is the same
as the proper composite loss ` with link (−L)′ on prediction v`,ψ. This last loss is in fact using its
canonical link and so is proper canonical [Reid and Williamson, 2010, Section 6.1], [Buja et al.,
2005]. Letting in this case c .= (−L)′−1(v`,ψ), we get that the partial loss satisfies
`1(c) = −v`,ψ + (−L)?(v`,ψ)− L(1). (31)
Notice the constant appearing on the right hand side. Notice also that if we see (28) as a Bregman
divergence, `1(c) = (−L)(1)− (−L)(c)− ((1− c)(−L′)(c) = D−L(1‖c), then the canonical link
is the function that defines uniquely the dual affine coordinate system of the divergence [Amari and
Nagaoka, 2000] (see also [Reid and Williamson, 2010, Appendix B]).
We can repeat the derivations for the partial loss `−1, which yields [Reid and Williamson, 2010,
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eq. (5)]:
`−1(c) + L(0) = −
∫ c
0
uL′′(u)du+ L(0)
= − [uL′(u)]c0 +
∫ c
0
L′(u)du
= −cL′(c) + L(c)− L(0) + L(0) (32)
= c · (−L′)(c)− (−L)(c)
= (−L)?((−L)′(c)), (33)
and using the canonical link, we get this time
`−1(c) = (−L)?(v`,ψ)− L(0). (34)
We get from (31) and (34) the canonical proper composite loss
`(y, v) = (−L)?(v`,ψ)− y + 1
2
· v`,ψ − 1
2
· ((1− y) · L(0) + (1 + y) · L(1)) . (35)
Note that for the optimisation of `(y, v) for v, we could discount the right-hand side parenthesis,
which acts just like a constant with respect to v. Using Fenchel-Young inequality yields the
non-negativity of `(y, v) as it brings (−L)?(v`,ψ)− ((y + 1)/2) · v`,ψ ≥ L((y + 1)/2) and so
`(y, v) ≥ L
(
1 + y
2
)
− 1
2
· ((1− y) · L(0) + (1 + y) · L(1))
= L
(
1
2
· (1− y) · 0 + 1
2
· (1 + y) · 1
)
− 1
2
· ((1− y) · L(0) + (1 + y) · L(1))
≥ 0, ∀y ∈ {−1, 1},∀v ∈ R, (36)
from Jensen’s inequality (the conditional Bayes risk L is always concave [Reid and Williamson,
2010]). Now, if we consider the alternative use of Fenchel-Young inequality,
(−L)?(v`,ψ)− 1
2
· v`,ψ ≥ L
(
1
2
)
, (37)
then if we let
∆(y)
.
= L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
· ((1− y) · L(0) + (1 + y) · L(1)) , (38)
then we get
`(y, v) ≥ ∆(y)− y
2
· v`,ψ,∀y ∈ {−1, 1},∀v ∈ R. (39)
It follows from (36) and (39),
`(y, v) ≥ max
{
0,∆(y)− y
2
· v`,ψ
}
,∀y ∈ {−1, 1},∀v ∈ R, (40)
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and we get, ∀h ∈ RX, a ∈ XX,
E(X,Y)∼D[`(y, h ◦ a(X))]
≥ E(X,Y)∼D
[
max
{
0,∆(Y)− Y
2
· (h ◦ a)`,ψ(X)
}]
≥ max
{
0,E(X,Y)∼D
[
∆(Y)− Y
2
· (h ◦ a(X))`,ψ
]}
= max
{
0, L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
· E(X,Y)∼D [Y · (h ◦ a(X))`,ψ + (1− Y) · L(0) + (1 + Y) · L(1)]
}
= max
{
0, L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
·
(
EX∼P [pi · ((h ◦ a(X))`,ψ + 2L(1))]
−EX∼N [(1− pi) · ((h ◦ a(X))`,ψ − 2L(0))]
)}
= max
{
0, L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
· (ϕ(P, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, pi, 2L(1))− ϕ(N, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, 1− pi,−2L(0)))
}
,(41)
with
ϕ(Q, f, b, c)
.
=
∫
X
b · (f(x) + c)dQ(x), (42)
and we recall
(h ◦ a)`,ψ = (−L′) ◦ ψ−1 ◦ h ◦ a. (43)
Hence,
min
h∈H
E(X,Y)∼D[max
a∈A
`(Y, h ◦ a(X))]
≥ min
h∈H
max
a∈A
E(X,Y)∼D[`(Y, h ◦ a(X))] (44)
≥ min
h∈H
max
a∈A
max
{
0, L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
· (ϕ(P, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, pi, 2L(1))− ϕ(N, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, 1− pi,−2L(0)))
}
≥ max
a∈A
min
h∈H
max
{
0, L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
· (ϕ(P, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, pi, 2L(1))− ϕ(N, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, 1− pi,−2L(0)))
}
= max
a∈A
max
{
0,min
h∈H
(
L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
· (ϕ(P, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, pi, 2L(1))− ϕ(N, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, 1− pi,−2L(0)))
)}
= max
a∈A
max
{
0, L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
·max
h∈H
(ϕ(P, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, pi, 2L(1))− ϕ(N, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, 1− pi,−2L(0)))
}
= max
a∈A
(
L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
·max
h∈H
(ϕ(P, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, pi, 2L(1))− ϕ(N, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, 1− pi,−2L(0)))
)
+
=
(
L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
·min
a∈A
max
h∈H
(ϕ(P, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, pi, 2L(1))− ϕ(N, (h ◦ a)`,ψ, 1− pi,−2L(0)))
)
+
=
(
L
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
·min
a∈A
γgH,a(P,N, pi, 2L(1), 2L(0))
)
+
=
(
`◦ − 1
2
·min
a∈A
γgH,a(P,N, pi, 2L(1), 2L(0))
)
+
=
(
`◦ − 1
2
·min
a∈A
βa
)
+
, (45)
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as claimed for the statement of Theorem 2 (we have let g .= (−L′) ◦ ψ−1). Hence, if, for some
ε ∈ [0, 1],
∃a ∈ A : γgH,a(P,N, pi, 2L(1), 2L(0)) ≤ 2ε · `◦, (46)
then
min
h∈H
E(X,Y)∼D[max
a∈A
`(Y, h ◦ a(X))] ≥ (`◦ − ε · `◦)+
= (1− ε) · `◦, (47)
which ends the proof of Corollary 3 if ` is proper composite with link ψ. If it is proper canonical,
then (−L′) ◦ ψ−1 = Id and so γgH,a = γH,a in (46).
11 Proof sketch of Corollary 5
Recall that βa = γH,a
(
P,N, 1
2
, 2L(1), 2L(0)
)
. We prove the following, more general result which
does not assume pi = 1/2 nor γ`hard = 0.
Corollary 13 Suppose ` is canonical proper and let H denote the unit ball of a reproducing kernel
Hilbert space (RKHS) of functions with reproducing kernel κ. Denote
µa,Q
.
=
∫
X
κ(a(x), .)dQ(x) (48)
the adversarial mean embedding of a on Q. Then
2 · γH,a(P,N, pi, 2L(1), 2L(0))
= γ`hard + ‖pi · µa,P − (1− pi) · µa,N‖H.
Proof It comes from the reproducing property of H,
2 · γH,a(P,N, pi, 2L(1), 2L(0))
= γ`hard + max
h∈H
{
pi ·
∫
X
h ◦ a(x)dP (x)− (1− pi) ·
∫
X
h ◦ a(x)dN(x)
}
= γ`hard + max
h∈H
{
pi ·
〈
h,
∫
X
κ(a(x), .)dP (x)
〉
H
− (1− pi) ·
〈
h,
∫
X
κ(a(x), .)dN(x)
〉
H
}
= γ`hard + max
h∈H
{〈h, pi · µa,P − (1− pi) · µa,N〉H}
= γ`hard + ‖pi · µa,P − (1− pi) · µa,N‖H, (49)
as claimed, where the last equality holds for the unit ball.
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12 Proof of Theorem 9
We first show a Lemma giving some additional properties on our definition os Lipschitzness.
Lemma 14 Suppose H is (u, v,K)-Lipschitz. If c is symmetric, then {u ◦ h − v ◦ h}h∈H is 2K-
Lipschitz. If c satisfies the triangle inequality, then u− v is bounded. If c satisfies the identity of
indiscernibles, then u ≤ v.
Proof If c is symmetric, then we just add two instances of (20) with x and y permuted, reorganize
and get:
u ◦ h(x)− v ◦ h(y) + u ◦ h(y)− v ◦ h(x) ≤ K · (c(x,y) + c(y,x)),∀h ∈ H,∀x,y ∈ X.
⇔ (u ◦ h− v ◦ h)(x)− (u ◦ h− v ◦ h)(y) ≤ 2Kc(x,y),∀h ∈ H,∀x,y ∈ X.
and we get the statement of the Lemma. If c satisfies the triangle inequality, then we add again two
instances of (20) but this time as follows:
u ◦ h(x)− v ◦ h(y) + u ◦ h(y)− v ◦ h(z) ≤ K · (c(x,y) + c(y, z)),∀h ∈ H,∀x,y, z ∈ X.
⇔ u ◦ h(x)− v ◦ h(z) + ∆(y) ≤ Kc(x, z),∀h ∈ H,∀x,y, z ∈ X,
where ∆(y) .= u ◦ h(y)− v ◦ h(y). If c is finite for at least one couple (x, z), then we cannot have
u−v unbounded in ∪hIm(h). Finally, if c satisfies the identity of indiscernibles, then picking x = y
in (20) yields u ◦ h(x)− v ◦ h(x) ≤ 0,∀h ∈ H,∀x ∈ X and so (u− v)(∪hIm(h)) ∩ R+ ⊆ {0},
which, disregarding the images in H for simplicity, yields u ≤ v.
We now prove TheoremthOTA. In fact, we shall prove the following more general Theorem.
Theorem 15 Fix any ε > 0 and proper loss ` with link ψ. Suppose ∃c : X× X→ R such that:
(1) H is (pi · g, (1− pi) · g,K)-Lipschitz with respect to c, where g is defined in (14);
(2) A is δ-Monge efficient for cost c on marginals P,N for
δ ≤ 2 · 2ε`
◦ − γ`hard
K
. (50)
Then H is ε-defeated by A on `.
Proof We have for all a ∈ A,
max
h∈H
(ϕ(P, h ◦ a, pi, 2L(1))− ϕ(N, h ◦ a, 1− pi,−2L(0)))
= γ`hard +
1
2
·max
h∈H
(∫
X
pi · g ◦ h ◦ a(x)dP (x)−
∫
X
(1− pi) · g ◦ h ◦ a(x′)dN(x′)
)
, (51)
where we recall g .= (−L′) ◦ ψ−1. Let us denote for short
∆
.
= max
h∈H
(∫
X
pi · g ◦ h ◦ a(x)dP (x)−
∫
X
(1− pi) · g ◦ h ◦ a(x′)dN(x′)
)
. (52)
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H being (pi · g, (1− pi) · g,K)-Lipschitz for cost c, since
H ⊆ {h ∈ RX : pig ◦ h ◦ a(x)− (1− pi)g ◦ h ◦ a(x′) ≤ Kc(a(x), a(x′)), ∀x,x′ ∈ X},
it comes after letting for short Ψ .= pig ◦ h ◦ a, χ .= (1− pi)g ◦ h ◦ a,
∆ ≤ max
Ψ(x)−χ(x′)≤Kc(a(x),a(x′))
(∫
X
Ψ(x)dP (x)−
∫
X
χ(x)dN(x)
)
≤ K · inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
c(a(x), a(x′))dµ(x,x′). (53)
See for example [Villani, 2009, Section 4] for the last inequality. Now, if some adversary a ∈ A is
δ-Monge efficient for cost c, then
K · inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
c(a(x), a(x′))dµ(x,x′) ≤ Kδ. (54)
From Theorem 2, if we want H to be ε-defeated by A, then it is sufficient from (51) that a satisfies
γ`hard +
1
2
·Kδ ≤ 2ε`◦, (55)
resulting in
δ ≤ 2 · 2ε`
◦ − γ`hard
K
, (56)
as claimed.
Remark 1 note that unless pi = 1/2, c cannot be a distance in the general case fot Theorem 9:
indeed, the identity of indiscernibles and Lemma 14 enforce (1− 2pi) · g ≥ 0 and so g cannot take
both signs, which is impossible whenever ` is canonical proper as g = Id in this case. We take it as
a potential difficulty for the adversary which, we recall, cannot act on pi.
Remark 2 In the light of recent results [Cissé et al., 2017, Cranko et al., 2018, Miyato et al.,
2018], there is an interesting corollary to Theorem 9 when pi = 1/2 using a form of Lipschitz
continuity of the link of the loss .
Corollary 16 Suppose loss ` is proper with link ψ and furthermore its canonical link satisfies, some
K` > 0:
(L)′(y)− (L)′(y′) ≤ K` · |ψ(y)− ψ(y′)|,∀y, y′ ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose furthermore that (i) pi = 1/2, (ii) H is Kh-Lipschitz with respect to some non-negative c
and (iii) A is δ-Monge efficient for cost c on marginals P,N for
δ ≤ 4ε`
◦ − 2γ`hard
K`Kh
. (57)
Then H is ε-defeated by A on `.
23
Proof The domination condition on links,
(L)′(y)− (L)′(y′) ≤ K` · |ψ(y)− ψ(y′)|, ∀y, y′ ∈ [0, 1], (58)
implies g is Lipschitz and letting y .= ψ−1 ◦ h ◦ a(x), y′ .= ψ−1 ◦ h ◦ a(x′), we obtain equivalently
g ◦ h ◦ a(x) − g ◦ h ◦ a(x) ≤ K` · |h ◦ a(x) − h ◦ a(x′)|,∀x,x′ ∈ X. But H is Kh-Lipschitz
with respect to some non-negative c, so we have |h ◦ a(x)− h ◦ a(x′)| ≤ Khc(a(x), a(x′)), and so
bringing these two inequalities together, we have from the proof of Theorem 9 that ∆ now satisfies
∆ ≤ K`Kh
2
· inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
c(a(x), a(x′))dµ(x,x′), (59)
so to be ε-defeated by A on `, we now want that a satisfies
γ`hard +
K`Kh
2
· δ ≤ 2ε`◦, (60)
resulting in the statement of the Corollary.
13 Proof of Theorem 12
Denote aJ .= a ◦ a ◦ ... ◦ a (J times). We have by definition
CΦ(a
J , P,N)
.
= inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
X
‖Φ ◦ aJ(x)− Φ ◦ aJ(x′)‖Hdµ(x,x′)
= inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
X
‖Φ ◦ a ◦ aJ−1(x)− Φ ◦ a ◦ aJ−1(x′)‖Hdµ(x,x′) (61)
≤ (1− η) · inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
X
‖Φ ◦ aJ−1(x)− Φ ◦ aJ−1(x′)‖Hdµ(x,x′)
...
≤ (1− η)J · inf
µ∈Π(P,N)
∫
X
‖Φ(x)− Φ(x′)‖Hdµ(x,x′)
= (1− η)J ·WΦ1 , (62)
where we have used the assumption that a is η-contractive and the definition of WΦ1 . There remains
to bound the last line by δ and solve for J to get the statement of the Theorem. We can also stop at
(61) to conclude that A is δ-Monge efficient for δ = (1− η) ·WΦ1 . The number of iterations for AJ
to be δ-Monge efficient is obtained from (62) as
J ≥ 1
log
(
1
1−η
) · log WΦ1
δ
, (63)
which gives the statement of the Theorem once we remark that log(1/(1− η)) ≤ 1/η.
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14 Proof of Lemma 10
The proof follows from the observation that for any x,x′ in S,
‖a(x)− a(x′)‖ = λ‖x− x′‖, (64)
where ‖.‖ is the metric of X. Thus, letting a denote a mixup to x∗ adversary for some λ ∈ [0, 1], we
have C(a, P,N) = λ ·W1(dP, dN), where W1(dP, dN) denotes the Wasserstein distance of order
1 between the class marginals. δ > 0 being fixed, all mixups to x∗ adversaries in A that are also
δ-Monge efficient are those for which:
λ ≤ δ
W1(dP, dN)
, (65)
and we get the statement of the Lemma.
15 Experiments
Figure 3 includes detailed plots for the α = 0.5 case of the numerical toy example.
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(a) Clean class distributions.
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(b) Adversarial class distributions.
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(c) Transport cost.
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(d) Optimal transport plan.
Figure 3: Visualising the toy example for the case α = 0.5. Clockwise from top left: (a) the
clean class conditional distributions, (b) the class distributions mapped by the adversary a, (c) the
transport cost c under the adversarial mapping a, (d) the corresponding optimal transport µ.
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Transformation of digits from class 1
(conventions follow the main file: the leftmost digit is the clean one, then
followed by transformed digits for strength 0.15, 0.3, 0.45, 0.6.)
27
28
29
Transformation of digits from class 3
30
31
